// Copyright 2010 The Go Authors. All rights reserved. // Use of this source code is governed by a BSD-style // license that can be found in the LICENSE file. package tls import ( "crypto" "crypto/aes" "crypto/cipher" "crypto/des" "crypto/hmac" "crypto/internal/boring" "crypto/rc4" "crypto/sha1" "crypto/sha256" "fmt" "hash" "internal/cpu" "runtime" _ "unsafe" // for linkname "golang.org/x/crypto/chacha20poly1305" ) // CipherSuite is a TLS cipher suite. Note that most functions in this package // accept and expose cipher suite IDs instead of this type. type CipherSuite struct { ID uint16 Name string // Supported versions is the list of TLS protocol versions that can // negotiate this cipher suite. SupportedVersions []uint16 // Insecure is true if the cipher suite has known security issues // due to its primitives, design, or implementation. Insecure bool } var ( supportedUpToTLS12 = []uint16{VersionTLS10, VersionTLS11, VersionTLS12} supportedOnlyTLS12 = []uint16{VersionTLS12} supportedOnlyTLS13 = []uint16{VersionTLS13} ) // CipherSuites returns a list of cipher suites currently implemented by this // package, excluding those with security issues, which are returned by // [InsecureCipherSuites]. // // The list is sorted by ID. Note that the default cipher suites selected by // this package might depend on logic that can't be captured by a static list, // and might not match those returned by this function. func CipherSuites() []*CipherSuite { return []*CipherSuite{ {TLS_AES_128_GCM_SHA256, "TLS_AES_128_GCM_SHA256", supportedOnlyTLS13, false}, {TLS_AES_256_GCM_SHA384, "TLS_AES_256_GCM_SHA384", supportedOnlyTLS13, false}, {TLS_CHACHA20_POLY1305_SHA256, "TLS_CHACHA20_POLY1305_SHA256", supportedOnlyTLS13, false}, {TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA, "TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA", supportedUpToTLS12, false}, {TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA, "TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA", supportedUpToTLS12, false}, {TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA, "TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA", supportedUpToTLS12, false}, {TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA, "TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA", supportedUpToTLS12, false}, {TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256, "TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256", supportedOnlyTLS12, false}, {TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384, "TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384", supportedOnlyTLS12, false}, {TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256, "TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256", supportedOnlyTLS12, false}, {TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384, "TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384", supportedOnlyTLS12, false}, {TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_CHACHA20_POLY1305_SHA256, "TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_CHACHA20_POLY1305_SHA256", supportedOnlyTLS12, false}, {TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_CHACHA20_POLY1305_SHA256, "TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_CHACHA20_POLY1305_SHA256", supportedOnlyTLS12, false}, } } // InsecureCipherSuites returns a list of cipher suites currently implemented by // this package and which have security issues. // // Most applications should not use the cipher suites in this list, and should // only use those returned by [CipherSuites]. func InsecureCipherSuites() []*CipherSuite { // This list includes RC4, CBC_SHA256, and 3DES cipher suites. See // cipherSuitesPreferenceOrder for details. return []*CipherSuite{ {TLS_RSA_WITH_RC4_128_SHA, "TLS_RSA_WITH_RC4_128_SHA", supportedUpToTLS12, true}, {TLS_RSA_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA, "TLS_RSA_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA", supportedUpToTLS12, true}, {TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA, "TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA", supportedUpToTLS12, true}, {TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA, "TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA", supportedUpToTLS12, true}, {TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256, "TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256", supportedOnlyTLS12, true}, {TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256, "TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256", supportedOnlyTLS12, true}, {TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384, "TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384", supportedOnlyTLS12, true}, {TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_RC4_128_SHA, "TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_RC4_128_SHA", supportedUpToTLS12, true}, {TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_RC4_128_SHA, "TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_RC4_128_SHA", supportedUpToTLS12, true}, {TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA, "TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA", supportedUpToTLS12, true}, {TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256, "TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256", supportedOnlyTLS12, true}, {TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256, "TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256", supportedOnlyTLS12, true}, } } // CipherSuiteName returns the standard name for the passed cipher suite ID // (e.g. "TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256"), or a fallback representation // of the ID value if the cipher suite is not implemented by this package. func CipherSuiteName(id uint16) string { for _, c := range CipherSuites() { if c.ID == id { return c.Name } } for _, c := range InsecureCipherSuites() { if c.ID == id { return c.Name } } return fmt.Sprintf("0x%04X", id) } const ( // suiteECDHE indicates that the cipher suite involves elliptic curve // Diffie-Hellman. This means that it should only be selected when the // client indicates that it supports ECC with a curve and point format // that we're happy with. suiteECDHE = 1 << iota // suiteECSign indicates that the cipher suite involves an ECDSA or // EdDSA signature and therefore may only be selected when the server's // certificate is ECDSA or EdDSA. If this is not set then the cipher suite // is RSA based. suiteECSign // suiteTLS12 indicates that the cipher suite should only be advertised // and accepted when using TLS 1.2. suiteTLS12 // suiteSHA384 indicates that the cipher suite uses SHA384 as the // handshake hash. suiteSHA384 ) // A cipherSuite is a TLS 1.0–1.2 cipher suite, and defines the key exchange // mechanism, as well as the cipher+MAC pair or the AEAD. type cipherSuite struct { id uint16 // the lengths, in bytes, of the key material needed for each component. keyLen int macLen int ivLen int ka func(version uint16) keyAgreement // flags is a bitmask of the suite* values, above. flags int cipher func(key, iv []byte, isRead bool) any mac func(key []byte) hash.Hash aead func(key, fixedNonce []byte) aead } var cipherSuites = []*cipherSuite{ // TODO: replace with a map, since the order doesn't matter. {TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_CHACHA20_POLY1305, 32, 0, 12, ecdheRSAKA, suiteECDHE | suiteTLS12, nil, nil, aeadChaCha20Poly1305}, {TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_CHACHA20_POLY1305, 32, 0, 12, ecdheECDSAKA, suiteECDHE | suiteECSign | suiteTLS12, nil, nil, aeadChaCha20Poly1305}, {TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256, 16, 0, 4, ecdheRSAKA, suiteECDHE | suiteTLS12, nil, nil, aeadAESGCM}, {TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256, 16, 0, 4, ecdheECDSAKA, suiteECDHE | suiteECSign | suiteTLS12, nil, nil, aeadAESGCM}, {TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384, 32, 0, 4, ecdheRSAKA, suiteECDHE | suiteTLS12 | suiteSHA384, nil, nil, aeadAESGCM}, {TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384, 32, 0, 4, ecdheECDSAKA, suiteECDHE | suiteECSign | suiteTLS12 | suiteSHA384, nil, nil, aeadAESGCM}, {TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256, 16, 32, 16, ecdheRSAKA, suiteECDHE | suiteTLS12, cipherAES, macSHA256, nil}, {TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA, 16, 20, 16, ecdheRSAKA, suiteECDHE, cipherAES, macSHA1, nil}, {TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256, 16, 32, 16, ecdheECDSAKA, suiteECDHE | suiteECSign | suiteTLS12, cipherAES, macSHA256, nil}, {TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA, 16, 20, 16, ecdheECDSAKA, suiteECDHE | suiteECSign, cipherAES, macSHA1, nil}, {TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA, 32, 20, 16, ecdheRSAKA, suiteECDHE, cipherAES, macSHA1, nil}, {TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA, 32, 20, 16, ecdheECDSAKA, suiteECDHE | suiteECSign, cipherAES, macSHA1, nil}, {TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256, 16, 0, 4, rsaKA, suiteTLS12, nil, nil, aeadAESGCM}, {TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384, 32, 0, 4, rsaKA, suiteTLS12 | suiteSHA384, nil, nil, aeadAESGCM}, {TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256, 16, 32, 16, rsaKA, suiteTLS12, cipherAES, macSHA256, nil}, {TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA, 16, 20, 16, rsaKA, 0, cipherAES, macSHA1, nil}, {TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA, 32, 20, 16, rsaKA, 0, cipherAES, macSHA1, nil}, {TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA, 24, 20, 8, ecdheRSAKA, suiteECDHE, cipher3DES, macSHA1, nil}, {TLS_RSA_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA, 24, 20, 8, rsaKA, 0, cipher3DES, macSHA1, nil}, {TLS_RSA_WITH_RC4_128_SHA, 16, 20, 0, rsaKA, 0, cipherRC4, macSHA1, nil}, {TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_RC4_128_SHA, 16, 20, 0, ecdheRSAKA, suiteECDHE, cipherRC4, macSHA1, nil}, {TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_RC4_128_SHA, 16, 20, 0, ecdheECDSAKA, suiteECDHE | suiteECSign, cipherRC4, macSHA1, nil}, } // selectCipherSuite returns the first TLS 1.0–1.2 cipher suite from ids which // is also in supportedIDs and passes the ok filter. func selectCipherSuite(ids, supportedIDs []uint16, ok func(*cipherSuite) bool) *cipherSuite { for _, id := range ids { candidate := cipherSuiteByID(id) if candidate == nil || !ok(candidate) { continue } for _, suppID := range supportedIDs { if id == suppID { return candidate } } } return nil } // A cipherSuiteTLS13 defines only the pair of the AEAD algorithm and hash // algorithm to be used with HKDF. See RFC 8446, Appendix B.4. type cipherSuiteTLS13 struct { id uint16 keyLen int aead func(key, fixedNonce []byte) aead hash crypto.Hash } // cipherSuitesTLS13 should be an internal detail, // but widely used packages access it using linkname. // Notable members of the hall of shame include: // - github.com/quic-go/quic-go // - github.com/sagernet/quic-go // // Do not remove or change the type signature. // See go.dev/issue/67401. // //go:linkname cipherSuitesTLS13 var cipherSuitesTLS13 = []*cipherSuiteTLS13{ // TODO: replace with a map. {TLS_AES_128_GCM_SHA256, 16, aeadAESGCMTLS13, crypto.SHA256}, {TLS_CHACHA20_POLY1305_SHA256, 32, aeadChaCha20Poly1305, crypto.SHA256}, {TLS_AES_256_GCM_SHA384, 32, aeadAESGCMTLS13, crypto.SHA384}, } // cipherSuitesPreferenceOrder is the order in which we'll select (on the // server) or advertise (on the client) TLS 1.0–1.2 cipher suites. // // Cipher suites are filtered but not reordered based on the application and // peer's preferences, meaning we'll never select a suite lower in this list if // any higher one is available. This makes it more defensible to keep weaker // cipher suites enabled, especially on the server side where we get the last // word, since there are no known downgrade attacks on cipher suites selection. // // The list is sorted by applying the following priority rules, stopping at the // first (most important) applicable one: // // - Anything else comes before RC4 // // RC4 has practically exploitable biases. See https://www.rc4nomore.com. // // - Anything else comes before CBC_SHA256 // // SHA-256 variants of the CBC ciphersuites don't implement any Lucky13 // countermeasures. See http://www.isg.rhul.ac.uk/tls/Lucky13.html and // https://www.imperialviolet.org/2013/02/04/luckythirteen.html. // // - Anything else comes before 3DES // // 3DES has 64-bit blocks, which makes it fundamentally susceptible to // birthday attacks. See https://sweet32.info. // // - ECDHE comes before anything else // // Once we got the broken stuff out of the way, the most important // property a cipher suite can have is forward secrecy. We don't // implement FFDHE, so that means ECDHE. // // - AEADs come before CBC ciphers // // Even with Lucky13 countermeasures, MAC-then-Encrypt CBC cipher suites // are fundamentally fragile, and suffered from an endless sequence of // padding oracle attacks. See https://eprint.iacr.org/2015/1129, // https://www.imperialviolet.org/2014/12/08/poodleagain.html, and // https://blog.cloudflare.com/yet-another-padding-oracle-in-openssl-cbc-ciphersuites/. // // - AES comes before ChaCha20 // // When AES hardware is available, AES-128-GCM and AES-256-GCM are faster // than ChaCha20Poly1305. // // When AES hardware is not available, AES-128-GCM is one or more of: much // slower, way more complex, and less safe (because not constant time) // than ChaCha20Poly1305. // // We use this list if we think both peers have AES hardware, and // cipherSuitesPreferenceOrderNoAES otherwise. // // - AES-128 comes before AES-256 // // The only potential advantages of AES-256 are better multi-target // margins, and hypothetical post-quantum properties. Neither apply to // TLS, and AES-256 is slower due to its four extra rounds (which don't // contribute to the advantages above). // // - ECDSA comes before RSA // // The relative order of ECDSA and RSA cipher suites doesn't matter, // as they depend on the certificate. Pick one to get a stable order. var cipherSuitesPreferenceOrder = []uint16{ // AEADs w/ ECDHE TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256, TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256, TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384, TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384, TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_CHACHA20_POLY1305, TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_CHACHA20_POLY1305, // CBC w/ ECDHE TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA, TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA, TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA, TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA, // AEADs w/o ECDHE TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256, TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384, // CBC w/o ECDHE TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA, TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA, // 3DES TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA, TLS_RSA_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA, // CBC_SHA256 TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256, TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256, TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256, // RC4 TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_RC4_128_SHA, TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_RC4_128_SHA, TLS_RSA_WITH_RC4_128_SHA, } var cipherSuitesPreferenceOrderNoAES = []uint16{ // ChaCha20Poly1305 TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_CHACHA20_POLY1305, TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_CHACHA20_POLY1305, // AES-GCM w/ ECDHE TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256, TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256, TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384, TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384, // The rest of cipherSuitesPreferenceOrder. TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA, TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA, TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA, TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA, TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256, TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384, TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA, TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA, TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA, TLS_RSA_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA, TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256, TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256, TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256, TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_RC4_128_SHA, TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_RC4_128_SHA, TLS_RSA_WITH_RC4_128_SHA, } // disabledCipherSuites are not used unless explicitly listed in Config.CipherSuites. var disabledCipherSuites = map[uint16]bool{ // CBC_SHA256 TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256: true, TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256: true, TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256: true, // RC4 TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_RC4_128_SHA: true, TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_RC4_128_SHA: true, TLS_RSA_WITH_RC4_128_SHA: true, } // rsaKexCiphers contains the ciphers which use RSA based key exchange, // which we also disable by default unless a GODEBUG is set. var rsaKexCiphers = map[uint16]bool{ TLS_RSA_WITH_RC4_128_SHA: true, TLS_RSA_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA: true, TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA: true, TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA: true, TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256: true, TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256: true, TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384: true, } // tdesCiphers contains 3DES ciphers, // which we also disable by default unless a GODEBUG is set. var tdesCiphers = map[uint16]bool{ TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA: true, TLS_RSA_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA: true, } var ( hasGCMAsmAMD64 = cpu.X86.HasAES && cpu.X86.HasPCLMULQDQ hasGCMAsmARM64 = cpu.ARM64.HasAES && cpu.ARM64.HasPMULL // Keep in sync with crypto/aes/cipher_s390x.go. hasGCMAsmS390X = cpu.S390X.HasAES && cpu.S390X.HasAESCBC && cpu.S390X.HasAESCTR && (cpu.S390X.HasGHASH || cpu.S390X.HasAESGCM) hasAESGCMHardwareSupport = runtime.GOARCH == "amd64" && hasGCMAsmAMD64 || runtime.GOARCH == "arm64" && hasGCMAsmARM64 || runtime.GOARCH == "s390x" && hasGCMAsmS390X ) var aesgcmCiphers = map[uint16]bool{ // TLS 1.2 TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256: true, TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384: true, TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256: true, TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384: true, // TLS 1.3 TLS_AES_128_GCM_SHA256: true, TLS_AES_256_GCM_SHA384: true, } // aesgcmPreferred returns whether the first known cipher in the preference list // is an AES-GCM cipher, implying the peer has hardware support for it. func aesgcmPreferred(ciphers []uint16) bool { for _, cID := range ciphers { if c := cipherSuiteByID(cID); c != nil { return aesgcmCiphers[cID] } if c := cipherSuiteTLS13ByID(cID); c != nil { return aesgcmCiphers[cID] } } return false } func cipherRC4(key, iv []byte, isRead bool) any { cipher, _ := rc4.NewCipher(key) return cipher } func cipher3DES(key, iv []byte, isRead bool) any { block, _ := des.NewTripleDESCipher(key) if isRead { return cipher.NewCBCDecrypter(block, iv) } return cipher.NewCBCEncrypter(block, iv) } func cipherAES(key, iv []byte, isRead bool) any { block, _ := aes.NewCipher(key) if isRead { return cipher.NewCBCDecrypter(block, iv) } return cipher.NewCBCEncrypter(block, iv) } // macSHA1 returns a SHA-1 based constant time MAC. func macSHA1(key []byte) hash.Hash { h := sha1.New // The BoringCrypto SHA1 does not have a constant-time // checksum function, so don't try to use it. if !boring.Enabled { h = newConstantTimeHash(h) } return hmac.New(h, key) } // macSHA256 returns a SHA-256 based MAC. This is only supported in TLS 1.2 and // is currently only used in disabled-by-default cipher suites. func macSHA256(key []byte) hash.Hash { return hmac.New(sha256.New, key) } type aead interface { cipher.AEAD // explicitNonceLen returns the number of bytes of explicit nonce // included in each record. This is eight for older AEADs and // zero for modern ones. explicitNonceLen() int } const ( aeadNonceLength = 12 noncePrefixLength = 4 ) // prefixNonceAEAD wraps an AEAD and prefixes a fixed portion of the nonce to // each call. type prefixNonceAEAD struct { // nonce contains the fixed part of the nonce in the first four bytes. nonce [aeadNonceLength]byte aead cipher.AEAD } func (f *prefixNonceAEAD) NonceSize() int { return aeadNonceLength - noncePrefixLength } func (f *prefixNonceAEAD) Overhead() int { return f.aead.Overhead() } func (f *prefixNonceAEAD) explicitNonceLen() int { return f.NonceSize() } func (f *prefixNonceAEAD) Seal(out, nonce, plaintext, additionalData []byte) []byte { copy(f.nonce[4:], nonce) return f.aead.Seal(out, f.nonce[:], plaintext, additionalData) } func (f *prefixNonceAEAD) Open(out, nonce, ciphertext, additionalData []byte) ([]byte, error) { copy(f.nonce[4:], nonce) return f.aead.Open(out, f.nonce[:], ciphertext, additionalData) } // xorNonceAEAD wraps an AEAD by XORing in a fixed pattern to the nonce // before each call. type xorNonceAEAD struct { nonceMask [aeadNonceLength]byte aead cipher.AEAD } func (f *xorNonceAEAD) NonceSize() int { return 8 } // 64-bit sequence number func (f *xorNonceAEAD) Overhead() int { return f.aead.Overhead() } func (f *xorNonceAEAD) explicitNonceLen() int { return 0 } func (f *xorNonceAEAD) Seal(out, nonce, plaintext, additionalData []byte) []byte { for i, b := range nonce { f.nonceMask[4+i] ^= b } result := f.aead.Seal(out, f.nonceMask[:], plaintext, additionalData) for i, b := range nonce { f.nonceMask[4+i] ^= b } return result } func (f *xorNonceAEAD) Open(out, nonce, ciphertext, additionalData []byte) ([]byte, error) { for i, b := range nonce { f.nonceMask[4+i] ^= b } result, err := f.aead.Open(out, f.nonceMask[:], ciphertext, additionalData) for i, b := range nonce { f.nonceMask[4+i] ^= b } return result, err } func aeadAESGCM(key, noncePrefix []byte) aead { if len(noncePrefix) != noncePrefixLength { panic("tls: internal error: wrong nonce length") } aes, err := aes.NewCipher(key) if err != nil { panic(err) } var aead cipher.AEAD if boring.Enabled { aead, err = boring.NewGCMTLS(aes) } else { boring.Unreachable() aead, err = cipher.NewGCM(aes) } if err != nil { panic(err) } ret := &prefixNonceAEAD{aead: aead} copy(ret.nonce[:], noncePrefix) return ret } // aeadAESGCMTLS13 should be an internal detail, // but widely used packages access it using linkname. // Notable members of the hall of shame include: // - github.com/xtls/xray-core // - github.com/v2fly/v2ray-core // // Do not remove or change the type signature. // See go.dev/issue/67401. // //go:linkname aeadAESGCMTLS13 func aeadAESGCMTLS13(key, nonceMask []byte) aead { if len(nonceMask) != aeadNonceLength { panic("tls: internal error: wrong nonce length") } aes, err := aes.NewCipher(key) if err != nil { panic(err) } aead, err := cipher.NewGCM(aes) if err != nil { panic(err) } ret := &xorNonceAEAD{aead: aead} copy(ret.nonceMask[:], nonceMask) return ret } func aeadChaCha20Poly1305(key, nonceMask []byte) aead { if len(nonceMask) != aeadNonceLength { panic("tls: internal error: wrong nonce length") } aead, err := chacha20poly1305.New(key) if err != nil { panic(err) } ret := &xorNonceAEAD{aead: aead} copy(ret.nonceMask[:], nonceMask) return ret } type constantTimeHash interface { hash.Hash ConstantTimeSum(b []byte) []byte } // cthWrapper wraps any hash.Hash that implements ConstantTimeSum, and replaces // with that all calls to Sum. It's used to obtain a ConstantTimeSum-based HMAC. type cthWrapper struct { h constantTimeHash } func (c *cthWrapper) Size() int { return c.h.Size() } func (c *cthWrapper) BlockSize() int { return c.h.BlockSize() } func (c *cthWrapper) Reset() { c.h.Reset() } func (c *cthWrapper) Write(p []byte) (int, error) { return c.h.Write(p) } func (c *cthWrapper) Sum(b []byte) []byte { return c.h.ConstantTimeSum(b) } func newConstantTimeHash(h func() hash.Hash) func() hash.Hash { boring.Unreachable() return func() hash.Hash { return &cthWrapper{h().(constantTimeHash)} } } // tls10MAC implements the TLS 1.0 MAC function. RFC 2246, Section 6.2.3. func tls10MAC(h hash.Hash, out, seq, header, data, extra []byte) []byte { h.Reset() h.Write(seq) h.Write(header) h.Write(data) res := h.Sum(out) if extra != nil { h.Write(extra) } return res } func rsaKA(version uint16) keyAgreement { return rsaKeyAgreement{} } func ecdheECDSAKA(version uint16) keyAgreement { return &ecdheKeyAgreement{ isRSA: false, version: version, } } func ecdheRSAKA(version uint16) keyAgreement { return &ecdheKeyAgreement{ isRSA: true, version: version, } } // mutualCipherSuite returns a cipherSuite given a list of supported // ciphersuites and the id requested by the peer. func mutualCipherSuite(have []uint16, want uint16) *cipherSuite { for _, id := range have { if id == want { return cipherSuiteByID(id) } } return nil } func cipherSuiteByID(id uint16) *cipherSuite { for _, cipherSuite := range cipherSuites { if cipherSuite.id == id { return cipherSuite } } return nil } func mutualCipherSuiteTLS13(have []uint16, want uint16) *cipherSuiteTLS13 { for _, id := range have { if id == want { return cipherSuiteTLS13ByID(id) } } return nil } func cipherSuiteTLS13ByID(id uint16) *cipherSuiteTLS13 { for _, cipherSuite := range cipherSuitesTLS13 { if cipherSuite.id == id { return cipherSuite } } return nil } // A list of cipher suite IDs that are, or have been, implemented by this // package. // // See https://www.iana.org/assignments/tls-parameters/tls-parameters.xml const ( // TLS 1.0 - 1.2 cipher suites. TLS_RSA_WITH_RC4_128_SHA uint16 = 0x0005 TLS_RSA_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA uint16 = 0x000a TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA uint16 = 0x002f TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA uint16 = 0x0035 TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256 uint16 = 0x003c TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256 uint16 = 0x009c TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384 uint16 = 0x009d TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_RC4_128_SHA uint16 = 0xc007 TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA uint16 = 0xc009 TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA uint16 = 0xc00a TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_RC4_128_SHA uint16 = 0xc011 TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA uint16 = 0xc012 TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA uint16 = 0xc013 TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA uint16 = 0xc014 TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256 uint16 = 0xc023 TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256 uint16 = 0xc027 TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256 uint16 = 0xc02f TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256 uint16 = 0xc02b TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384 uint16 = 0xc030 TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384 uint16 = 0xc02c TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_CHACHA20_POLY1305_SHA256 uint16 = 0xcca8 TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_CHACHA20_POLY1305_SHA256 uint16 = 0xcca9 // TLS 1.3 cipher suites. TLS_AES_128_GCM_SHA256 uint16 = 0x1301 TLS_AES_256_GCM_SHA384 uint16 = 0x1302 TLS_CHACHA20_POLY1305_SHA256 uint16 = 0x1303 // TLS_FALLBACK_SCSV isn't a standard cipher suite but an indicator // that the client is doing version fallback. See RFC 7507. TLS_FALLBACK_SCSV uint16 = 0x5600 // Legacy names for the corresponding cipher suites with the correct _SHA256 // suffix, retained for backward compatibility. TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_CHACHA20_POLY1305 = TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_CHACHA20_POLY1305_SHA256 TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_CHACHA20_POLY1305 = TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_CHACHA20_POLY1305_SHA256 )